Abstract-Many identity-based public key cryptosystems from bilinear pairings use hash functions to construct their public keys. Most of these schemes only specify the need of applying cryptographic strong or collision free hash functions, without giving any detail of which or what hash functions should be used. Traditional understanding of a cryptographic strong hash function has three security properties, which are pre-image resistance, second pre-image resistance and collision resistance. However, with only these three properties, in this paper we show a potential security vulnerability of identity-based cryptographic cryptosystems if the hash functions used are not correctly constructed. To fix this vulnerability, this paper defines an additional desirable security property for the hash functions in these identity-based cryptosystems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public key cryptography is used in a variety of security applications such as secure message exchange, secret sharing, digital signatures, digital watermarking, identity authentication, data integrity checking and much more. However, most of current existing public key cryptosystems require communicating parties knowing each other's public key. To ensure the validity of each other's public key, it requires a trusted third party issuing public key certificates [1] for all participating entities in a cryptosystem. Even though inquiring and verifying each other's public key certificate in every communication is not too expensive to do, it is obviously annoying and interruptive.
To take out the requirement of public key certificates, an identity-based cryptosystem, introduced by Shamir [2] in 1984, is a public key cryptosystem, which intended to embed user's identities into the construction of their public keys. As a result, each user can derive another user's public key without the need of public key certificates from a third trusted party.
In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [3] proposed an identity based encryption scheme from Weil pairings. Following their paper, many identity-based cryptographic schemes, based on bilinear pairings from supersingular elliptic curves, were proposed in the literature such as those in [4] - [14] . The public key generation in these schemes is simple and similar, merely the hash value of each user's publicly known identity. Instead of providing any specific hash functions, these schemes only gave a very general statement that the hash functions used must be cryptographic strong. Traditionally, a hash function is said to be cryptographic strong if it satisfies the following four properties: easy forward computation, pre-image resistance, second pre-image resistance and collision resistance. In this paper, we provide a simple hash function satisfying the above four properties, but the resulting identity-based schemes are insecure, where private keys can be easily derived from public keys.
To be secure against this vulnerability, the hash functions used must satisfy an additional property, name it "image ratio resistance" in this paper. A hash function H satisfying this property should generate images such that the ratio between them is hard to compute. In other words, given arbitrary two pre-images 1 m and 2 m , it is hard to compute the ratio c such that
The main contribution of this paper is explicitly pointing out and defining this desired hash property in identity-based cryptosystems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II gives the definition of a cryptographic strong hash function, as well as defining the proposed image ratio resistance hashing property. In this section, we also provide some mathematical background of bilinear pairings. Section III describes briefly the common key generation procedure in identity-based cryptosystems based on supersingular elliptic curves and its typical signature and verification scheme using bilinear pairings. Section IV gives a simple cryptographic strong hash function without the image ratio resistance property and then describes the security vulnerability of the resulting identity-based cryptosystems. Hash functions with the image ratio resistance property will also be suggested in this section. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we give some required mathematical background for identity-based cryptosystems, including cryptographic hash functions and bilinear pairings. [16] hash functions are believed to be cryptographically strong, even though some research showed that they were vulnerable to collision resistant. However, most of security schemes or protocols based on hash functions only rely on their pre-image resistance and/or second pre-image resistance. Thus, these security schemes/protocols are still safe for now.
A. Hash Functions
In this paper, we propose and define another hash function property, image ratio resistance, as below: Definition: A hash function H is said to be image ratio resistance if it is hard to derive the ratio c such that
Without using image ratio resistance hash functions, identity-based cryptosystems are insecure. Unfortunately, most identity-based papers only specify the need of using cryptographic strong hash functions, which do not include the property of image ratio resistance. In Section IV, we give a simple cryptographic hash function that satisfies the original three resistance properties but fails on the image ratio resistance, and then describe a potential security vulnerability of the resulting identity-based cryptographic schemes.
B. Bilinear Pairings
Given a cyclic additive group ) , ( 1  G with a generator P and a cyclic multiplicative group ) , ( 2  G of the same prime order q , a bilinear map
satisfies the following properties:
 Bilinearity:
 Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
The security of bilinear maps relies on the hardness assumption of some Diffie-Hellman problems such as 1) Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): Given 
III. COMMON IDENTITY-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM KEY GENERATION
In this section, we describe briefly the common key generation procedure in most identity-based cryptosystems. Each user i U in a system has a unique identity
There is a trusted private key generator (PKG) responsible for key generation. generation, we give a typical identity-based signature scheme in the following sections for the purpose of completeness and readability, though our proposed security vulnerability only exploits the weakness of the key generation procedure.
A. Setup

C. Signature Generation
To sign a message 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Before exploiting the potential vulnerability of the common key generation procedure described in the section III.B, we first discuss the hardness assumption of CDHP and its implication to the security of identity-based cryptosystems.
A. Hardness Assumption of CDHP
The security of the identity-based cryptosystem is based on the hardness assumption of CDHP. For the signature scheme presented in the previous section, a malicious user i U may try to derive secret information
This derivation is a difficult CDHP since i U , with known information P , sP (which is pub P ) and P r j (which is j V ), is trying to compute sP r j (which is pub j P r can be inferred by some other means, the private key can be derived easily, or in other words, the identity-based cryptosystems are insecure.
B. The Potential Security Vulnerability
Security vulnerability can be exploited in the common key generation procedure in most of the identity-based cryptographic schemes. The vulnerability described in this section can be applied to all these identity-based schemes. Assume an implementer of an identity-based scheme is misguided by the scheme specification and uses a cryptographic strong hash function satisfying only the original three resistance properties. There is a straightforward way to come up such hash function, 
